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The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this case 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann, S 78-2-2 (1953); and Article VIII, 
Section 4 of the Utah State Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. The primary issue in this case is whether the trial 
court properly granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment 
based on the pleadings in the case as well as Plaintiff's 
deposition. The standard for review is set out in Hansen v. 
Stewart. 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988). 
2. Secondarily, there is an issue as to whether the 
Plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial, as a matter of right, on 
the issue of the statute of limitations, because of the 
bifurcation statute, Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-47 (1987). 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-14(1) (1979), provides: 
(1) No malpractice action against a health care 
provider may be brought unless it is commenced within 
two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or 
through the use of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered the injury, whichever first occurs, but not 
to exceed four years after the date of the alleged act, 
omission, neglect or occurrence. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-12-47 (1971), provides: 
In any action against a physician and surgeon 
• . . for professional negligence . . . if the 
responsible pleading of the defendant pleads that the 
action is barred by the statute of limitations, and if 
either party so moves the court, the issue raised 
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thereby may be tried separately and before other issues 
in the case are tried. . . . 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This case involves a claim fox medical malpractice. The 
claimed malpractice took place in April, 1985. The Plaintiff did 
nothing to protect her claim until November, 1988. After taking 
the Plaintiff's deposition, the Defendants moved for summary 
judgment based on the applicable statute of limitations, Section 
78-14-4, Utah Code Ann. (1979). The trial judge granted the 
Motion for Summary Judgment and also denied Plaintiff's Motion to 
Alter or Amend the Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff's statement of facts is accurate, but is 
misleading and incomplete. It emphasizes only certain aspects of 
Plaintiff's testimony but does not give the Court the full basis 
upon which the trial judge granted Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. For those reasons, this respondent sets forth the 
following additional factual statements: 
1. This case involves a claim of medical malpractice 
arising out of Defendants' alleged negligent failure to diagnose 
breast cancer on April 3, 1985. 
2. On April 3, 1985, Plaintiff went to the Ogden Clinic, 
at which time Dr. Boyd Farr examined a lump on the Plaintiff's 
right breast. He then consulted with Dr. Chris Christensen 
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regarding the nature of the lump. Dr. Farr told the Plaintiff to 
return in three months to check the lump again. (Plaintiff's 
Deposition p. 11). 
3. During the next three months, the patient was 
instructed to examine herself regularly. Accordingly, at least 
once a week, she made self-examinations of the lump. She didn't 
notice any change in either the hardness of the lump, its 
location or its size until July of 1985. (Plaintiff's 
Deposition, pp. 14, 15). 
4. "Just within probably a few days," the lump seemed to 
get much larger so the Plaintiff went to see Dr. Gardner for a 
different opinion. (Plaintiff's Deposition, p. 15). 
5. When the Plaintiff saw Dr. Gardner in the middle of 
July, 1985, she was informed the lump was probably cancerous. 
(Plaintiff's Deposition, p. 16). 
6. Dr. Gardner biopsied the lump on July 17, 1985. That 
same date Plaintiff received the results of the biopsy. She was 
informed by Dr. Gardner that the lump "was definitely cancer and 
that she needed to have surgery." When the Plaintiff asked him 
about the examinations by Defendants three months earlier, 
Plaintiff testified: "[Dr. Gardner] looked at the records and 
[Defendants] had measured it and he said it had grown about three 
times that size since my visit with him and it was definitely the 
same lump." (Plaintiff's Deposition, pp. 17-18, 23-25). 
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7. On July 19, 1985, Dr. Gardner performed a modified 
radical mastectomy to treat the cancerous mass in the Plaintiff's 
right breast. (Plaintiff's Deposition, p. 18). 
8. As early as July, 1985, when she learned that she had 
cancer, the Plaintiff was upset with Defendants. She testified: 
Q. Were you upset in July of 1985, emotionally upset 
with Dr. Farr when you learned that you had 
cancer? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why were you upset with him? 
A. Because I thought I trusted him. 
Q. Why did you feel he had violated your trust? 
A. Because I had cancer. 
Q. And you felt he should have discovered the cancer 
in April, 1985? 
A. Yes. 
(Plaintiff's Deposition, p. 27). 
Q. In July of 1985, when Dr. Gardner informed you you 
had cancer, you were upset with Dr. Farr because 
you felt he should have found the cancer that you 
believe to be the same one in April of 1985, 
correct? 
A. Right. 
(Plaintiff's Deposition, p. 28). 
Q. At that time when you were told that and you 
thought back why didn't they diagnose it earlier, 
did you think that would have somehow made a 
difference in the treatment you received? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Why did you think it would make a difference? 
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A. Because I thought they could have done a 
lumpectomy and maybe in that three month's time it 
hadn't spread, so maybe I wouldn't have had to go 
through the chemotherapy. 
Q. And that's what you thought when Dr. Gardner told 
you you had cancer? 
A. I didn't think about the chemotherapy, but I 
thought about the lumpectomy, that maybe that 
could have been done. 
Q. Did you then think that maybe it would have 
resulted in a different prognosis as far as the 
ultimate outcome of your cancer? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you have somehow in your mind the thought that 
early diagnosis of breast cancer results in better 
cure rates? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that went through your mind back when Dr. 
Gardner told you you had cancer in July of 1985? 
A. Yes. 
(Plaintiff's Deposition, pp. 36-37). 
Q. You told Mr. Campbell a few minutes ago that when 
Dr. Gardner told you you had cancer following the 
biopsy you were angry; is that right? 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. Were you angry at Dr. Christensen as well as Dr. 
Farr? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were you more angry at one than the other? 
A. No. 
Q. Just both of them? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Why were you angry? 
A. Because both of them had checked me out three 
months earlier and told me I didn't have cancer. 
(Plaintiff's Deposition, pp. 35-36). 
Q. You felt in your own mind at that time that Dr. 
Farr and Dr. Christensen had made a mistake? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You really felt they should have picked up this 
cancer in April? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you still feel that way? 
A. Yes. 
(Plaintiff's Deposition, pp. 38-39). 
Q. So you already had those feelings, didn't you, the 
feelings that they had somehow mistreated you? 
A. Right. 
Q. And you had those feelings for by them three 
years? 
A. I didn't even start thinking about that until I 
was able -- of chemotherapy. I knew they had 
screwed up, but it wasn't on my mind every day. 
(Plaintiff's Deposition, pp. 56-57). 
9. The Plaintiff did not gain any factual information 
concerning either the injury she claims she has suffered, or the 
claimed negligence of the Defendants between August, 1985, and 
October, 1988. (Plaintiff's Deposition, p. 28). 
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10. The treatment for Plaintiff's cancer, including the 
chemotherapy, was completed in February, 1986. She had no 
further treatment by way of radiation therapy or chemotherapy 
after that time. (Plaintiff's Deposition, p. 19). 
11. The reason the Plaintiff decided to make a claim 
against the Defendants was because she went to Dr. Stephan 
Ralston on September 9, 1988, to investigate the possibility of 
having reconstructive surgery done. She discovered that she 
probably could not afford to have the surgery, and that was what 
started her thinking about filing a lawsuit. It was nothing 
Dr. Ralston said about the treatment by Dr. Christensen or 
Dr. Farr that caused her to think she had a valid malpractice 
claim. (Plaintiff's Deposition, pp. 55-56). 
12. Defendants were not served with a Notice of Intent to 
Commence Action until November 1, 1988, over three years after 
Plaintiff knew that Defendants had failed to diagnose her breast 
cancer. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The district court properly granted Defendants' motions 
for summary judgment because Plaintiff's claims were barred by 
the applicable statute of limitations. The Health Care 
Malpractice Act requires plaintiffs to commence suit within two 
years after they discover, or through the use of reasonable 
diligence should have discovered, the injury. Plaintiff's own 
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testimony established that she knew, or through the use of 
reasonable diligence should have known, that she had sustained an 
injury that was attributable to the alleged negligent conduct of 
the Defendant. 
2. The Plaintiff has misconstrued the applicable test to 
determine when the statute of limitations begins. The criteria 
urged by the Plaintiff has no basis in fact or law. 
3. Actual knowledge of medical negligence is not requisite 
to commence running of the statute. 
4. The independent trial on the statute of limitations 
issue provided by the Health Care Malpractice Act is subject to 
summary judgment, like all other issues, if no genuine issues of 
material fact are raised. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. THE PLAINTIFF KNEW, OR 
SHOULD HAVE KNOWN, OF THE EXISTENCE OF HER 
INJURY AND THAT THE INJURY COULD BE 
ATTRIBUTED TO THE NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANTS. 
The court is to grant summary judgment when it determines 
that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Utah 
R.Civ.P. 56(c). 
In Floyd v. Western Surgical Assoc, 773 P.2d 402 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989), the Utah Supreme Court stated: "On appeal from a 
summary judgment, we view the evidence presented to the trial 
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court in the light most favorable to the losing party." Id. at 
403. "When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a trial 
court may consider the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file." Utah 
R.Civ.P. 56(c); Floyd, 773 P.2d at 403. 
In granting Defendants' motions for Summary Judgment, the 
trial court was faced with the issue of whether Plaintiff's 
claims were time-barred. The Health Care Malpractice Act states: 
No malpractice action against a health care provider 
may be brought unless it is commenced within two years 
after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through 
the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, 
the injury, whichever first occurs . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(1) (1979). The trial court held that as 
early as July, 1985 Plaintiff had knowledge of the existence of 
an injury, its cause and the possibility of negligence. 
Based on testimony by the Plaintiff during her deposition on 
September 29, 1989, the Plaintiff learned by mid-July, 1985, that 
Dr. Christensen failed to diagnose breast cancer during an 
examination in April, 1985. Another physician, Dr. Gardner, 
biopsied the lump and diagnosed cancer on July 17, 1985. The 
Plaintiff testified that by July she knew the doctors had missed 
the cancer and had they realized the full extent of her problems 
in April, she may have had better results. 
Plaintiff's counsel asserts that the district court erred by 
not construing the facts in the light most favorable to the 
Plaintiff. Plaintiff's counsel offers no basis for this 
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assertion other than a legal conclusion that had the district 
court construed the facts in a light most favorable to the 
Plaintiff, it would have found that there was a genuine issue of 
fact. 
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth 
that a plaintiff or defendant cannot rely upon the mere 
allegations or denials of her pleadings to avoid a summary 
judgment but must set forth specific facts showing that there is 
a genuine issue for trial. See Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224, 
226 (Utah 1983); Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1979). 
The Plaintiff cannot rely on the bare assertion in her 
Complaint that she did not know that her injury was caused by 
another party's negligence to create an issue of fact that would 
preclude summary judgment. 
In Foil v. Ballinaer, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that in order for the statute to begin to run, 
the patient must know, or through the use of reasonable diligence 
should have known, that he sustained some injury and that the 
injury suffered can be attributed to the negligent conduct on the 
part of the Defendant. Id. at 155. From the quoted testimony 
under the "Facts" section of this Brief, it is clear that by July 
of 1985, the Plaintiff discovered an injury and attributed the 
cause of that injury to the alleged negligent conduct of the 
Defendant. Nothing more is required under Foil to trigger the 
running of the two-year statute of limitations. The Plaintiff's 
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deposition extinguished any issue of fact by explicitly setting 
forth that the Plaintiff knew on July 17, 1985 that 
Dr. Christensen had made a mistake by not discovering cancer in 
April and had Dr. Christensen detected cancer the results might 
have been less severe. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CASE CITED BY PLAINTIFF 
DID NOT MODIFY THE LEADING SUPREME COURT CASE 
THAT SET FORTH THE CRITERIA FOR INVOKING THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
CASES. 
Plaintiff's Brief asserts that the Foil case, 601 P.2d 144 
(Utah 1979), was modified by Deschamps v. Pulley, 784 P.2d 471 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). Foil establishes that the statutory two-
year limitations period does not commence to run until the 
injured person (1) knows or should know that she has sustained an 
injury, and (2) knows or should know that this injury was caused 
by negligence. Foil, supra at 147. Plaintiff's counsel 
misconstrues Deschamps to hold that the two-year statute of 
limitations period should not commence to run until the injured 
person (1) knows or should know that she has sustained an injury, 
and (2) knows, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence, 
should know of the existence of a reasonable possibility of 
medical negligence. 
Aside from the fact that Court of Appeals decisions do not 
supersede Supreme Court decisions, nowhere in Deschamps does the 
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court state that they are modifying the Foil test. In fact, the 
court in Deschamps held that the plaintiff "knew or should have 
known more than two years before she filed this action that her 
mother's death was the result of the health care provider's 
negligence." Deschamps, supra at 475. This language is directly 
from the Foil test and mentions nothing about "reasonable 
possibility of negligence" as urged by Plaintiff's counsel. The 
court further stated that the plaintiff "was aware of her legal 
injury under the Foil test . . . ." Again, the court mentioned 
nothing about a modified Foil test. 
Plaintiff's counsel bases his modified version of the Foil 
test on a portion of Hargett v. Llmbero, F.Supp. 152 (D. Utah 
1984) cited in Deschamps which states: 
[T]he crucial question is whether the plaintiff was 
aware of the facts that would lead a reasonable person 
to conclude that he may have a cause of action against 
the health care provider. Those facts include the 
existence of an injury, its cause and the possibility 
of negligence. 
Hargett, 598 F.Supp. at 155 (citations omitted). After a few 
sleight of the hands, Plaintiff's counsel comes up with a new 
test that takes "reasonable person" and "possibility of 
negligence" and forms "reasonable possibility of medical 
negligence." 
As stated previously, the court in Deschamps did not modify 
the Foil test and their holding confirms that they are applying 
an unmodified Foil test. 
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POINT III 
AN EXPERT MEDICAL OPINION CONFIRMING MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE IS NOT NEEDED BEFORE THE TOLLING 
OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BEGIN. 
Plaintiff contends that it is not reasonable to require a 
lay person such as the Plaintiff to make a causal connection 
between Defendants' failure to diagnose her cancer and any 
possible injury she may have suffered as a result, without first 
obtaining further information from some educated source. 
In Deschamps, supra, the Court of Appeals responded to this 
assertion as follows: 
If we accepted [plaintiff's] position that she could 
not know of her legal injury until she received an 
expert medical opinion confirming malpractice, the 
statute would be tolled in every case until a plaintiff 
not only decided to seek, but found favorable expert 
medical testimony. We do not believe this result is 
consistent with the purpose of the statutory scheme. 
Id. at 475 (footnotes omitted). 
Plaintiff argues that because the doctor who supervised her 
chemotherapy and the doctor who performed her sterilization 
therapy would not confirm medical malpractice, the statute of 
limitations did not begin to run until such confirmation was 
obtained from an educated source. If Plaintiff's argument were 
taken to the extreme, it would mean that the statute of 
limitations would not begin to run until there was a jury verdict 
concluding that medical malpractice existed. 
Similarly, as the court in Deschamps would not accept the 
position that an expert medical opinion confirming medical 
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malpractice is needed before the tolling of the statute of 
limitations begins, neither should the Plaintiff in the case at 
hand be allowed to do so. 
POINT IV 
THE INDEPENDENT TRIAL ON THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS ISSUE PROVIDED BY THE HEALTH CARE 
MALPRACTICE ACT IS SUBJECT TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IF 
NO GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT ARE RAISED. 
Plaintiff's counsel asserts that the Utah Supreme Court 
disfavors the granting of summary judgment in medical malpractice 
cases because of the existence of a statutory provision for a 
separate trial on the issue of the running of the statute of 
limitations. The statute says: 
In any action against a physician . . . if the 
responsive pleading of the defendant pleads that the 
action is barred by this statute of limitations/ and if 
either party so moves the court, the issue raised 
thereby may be tried separately before any issues in 
the case are tried. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-47 (1971). 
In addressing the application of an independent trial on the 
statute of limitations issue, the Utah Supreme court stated that 
ff[i]t is, however, like all other issues, subject to summary 
judgment if no genuine issues of material fact are raised." 
Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93, 100 (Utah 1982). See also 
Am.Jur.2d, Limitation of Actions, S 470; 61 A.L.R.2d 341. 
Plaintiff bases her assertion on Justice Durham's holding in 
Brower v. Brown, 744 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1987). Plaintiff fails to 
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mention that Justice Durham's position was not a majority with 
respect to the issue on whether the plaintiff knew she had 
received a legal injury. Justice Zimmerman, for an equally 
divided court, held that as a matter of law the plaintiff was on 
notice that she had a legal injury and the trial court's summary 
judgment on this issue should be affirmed. Id. at 1340. 
Additionally, Justice Durham held that the trial court improperly 
granted summary judgment because the facts were unclear that the 
plaintiff should have known of her legal injuries when the 
negligence occurred. Id. at 1339. Nowhere in the opinion does 
it state that a motion for summary judgment in medical 
malpractice cases is disfavored where the issue is the running of 
the statute of limitations, as urged in Plaintiff's Brief. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff did not file her claim within the requisite 
time period. The logical extension of her argument would result 
in total emasculation of the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act. 
Based on her own testimony, the trial court found that there is 
no genuine issue of material fact, and that opinion should be 
affirmed. 
DATED this A, day of August, 1990. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
B* f7& ^WX/^ David W. Slagle 
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